Party competition in the elections to the Transcarpathian Regional Council: an empirical analysis

  • M. M. Shelemba Uzhgorod National University
  • M. M. Shelemba Uzhgorod National University
Keywords: methodology of the Nagayama Diagram, political parties, electoral process, local elections, competitive positions, division, electoral support


The regional peculiarities of party competition in the Transcarpathian region were identified based on the results of local elections in Ukraine in 2010, 2015. For analytical work, a graphic way of presenting electoral competition, called the methodology of the Nagayama Diagrams, is used. At the methodological level, it is determined that the Nagayama Diagram can be depicted using the graph, with the X-axis containing the results in percentages received by the political party-leader of the electoral support (the first party), but Y is the election results received by the political party, which was in the second place of voting. It is noted that the methodology stipulates that the results of elections should be limited by a triangle whose vertex means the result when two parties evenly divide among themselves electoral votes, the left segment – a situation in which the leading party failed to score half the votes, if the party leader receives more than half the votes of voters.It is noted that this methodology allows us to assess the situation: when there are non-influential third parties in the respective electoral districts (districts, districts), and the two most powerful receive a greater proportion of voters; when territories (electoral districts, districts, etc.) have intense competition, at least between two political parties, the situation; when the electoral territories develop in conditions of bipolar competition (Duverger equilibrium); when the electoral districts (territories) do not have the domination of the two largest political parties in the electoral space, and they do not create a situation of intense competition; when the electoral territories are characterized by significant multi-party competition (polycentric competition); when the electoral territories have only one dominant political party (a sign of monocentric competition); with the absence of a dominant party in most of the territory and the minimum gap between the political forces who occupied the first and second places. It is established that the given method allows to estimate a comprehensive picture of the state of party competition at different levels of the election process, including within the framework of local elections.The study made it possible to identify the character of party competition between the two political forces that took leading positions in the Transcarpathian region during the local elections in Ukraine in 2015.According to the data of local elections in the Transcarpathian region in 2010 and 2015 it was found that there was no sharp competition in this region, the turnout of voters in 2015 compared with 2010 decreased by more than 5% in the electoral space the border areas of Hungary strengthened the position of the party of national minorities, in the electoral districts there was not formed a single political force that was dominant and would receive half the votes of voters.


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How to Cite
Shelemba, M. M., & Shelemba, M. M. (2018). Party competition in the elections to the Transcarpathian Regional Council: an empirical analysis. Grani, 21(2), 134-140.